Human rights defenders explained Kadyrov's threats about sending to the front.
The sending of Chechens from various regions of Russia to the front, whose behavior, according to Ramzan Kadyrov, "raises concerns", is mainly carried out through unofficial coercive methods and without following formalities, human rights defenders interviewed by "Caucasian Knot" indicated.
As reported by "Caucasian Knot", Ramzan Kadyrov threatened to send people from Chechnya, whose behavior "raises concerns", to the combat zone in Ukraine. The threat was made during a meeting between Kadyrov and State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, who was reporting on the work of the Chechen leader's representatives.
Residents of Chechnya are forcibly sent to Ukraine as punishment for alcohol use, drug use, and minor offenses. This information was once again confirmed by human rights defenders in October 2025. It was also previously voiced by entrepreneur Aslanbek Akhmetkhanov, who indicated that sending offenders to the front is "such a punishment".
Kadyrov's new statement should be viewed in the context of the already existing practice of forcibly sending Chechens to the combat zone, rather than as a separate threat, believes Chechen activist in Europe Islam Belokiev*. In his opinion, informal pressure methods are more likely to be applied to the "offenders".
"It is likely that we are not talking about the standard procedure for issuing summonses, but about mechanisms of coercion to conclude military contracts. There have been numerous cases where people were detained, intimidated, pressure was applied to their relatives, and they were effectively faced with a choice: either go to the front or face other troubles from law enforcement agencies," he noted.
Previously, reasons such as alcohol use, drug use, minor offenses, and other circumstances that could not legally justify coercion to a military contract were used, the activist reminded. He believes that such people will not receive combat training at the Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, which is advertised by those officially sent to the front from Grozny.
"I would not assert that it will be through him that the sending of people, as Kadyrov says, will be carried out. The mechanism of coercion and the infrastructure for training military personnel are different things," Belokiev* noted.
The director of the human rights group "Citizen. Army. Law"* Sergey Krivenko* does not rule out that Kadyrov may "ask" military enlistment offices in other regions to mobilize young Chechens (aged 18 to 30) from other regions or draft them for compulsory military service.
"Some may be "registered" in the Chechen special forces, so they will receive military status and can be sent to the front. But it is unlikely that they will actually do this; it requires a lot of resources and efforts for registration," he told "Caucasian Knot". At the same time, the human rights defender views Kadyrov's statement primarily as a propaganda action aimed at intimidation.
A tool for controlling Chechens without jurisdiction limits
Kadyrov's representatives in the regions of Russia, whose work was discussed at the meeting between Kadyrov and Delimkhanov, were created to support Chechens living outside the republic, but in practice, they primarily engage in control.
"Formally, they are supposed to help people from Chechnya solve social, domestic, and other problems, but in fact, their activities have another side. It is indicative that Adam Delimkhanov himself previously spoke about working with Chechens whose behavior representatives of the Russian republican authorities consider inappropriate. This involved conducting special conversations, involving relatives, and even returning such people to Chechnya for further work with them. Thus, the representations become a tool for controlling Chechen communities outside the republic," explained Islam Belokiev*.
In previous years, Adam Delimkhanov was also entrusted with similar "work outside the region": for example, in August 2025, Kadyrov called for identifying people "spreading slander and misinformation" on social networks and messengers.
Formally, the representations do not have the authority to detain people, issue summonses, or coerce into signing contracts. "But they can have significant informal influence, interact with local communities, relatives, and representatives of law enforcement agencies. And this influence can be used for pressure on people under certain circumstances. It is important to pay attention to Kadyrov's wording about "justified concerns" – he does not explain what exactly is meant. What actions are considered unacceptable? Who determines the degree of a person's guilt? On what criteria is the decision to send to the front made? Such uncertainty leaves the authorities with very broad opportunities for arbitrary application of this practice. Almost anyone can potentially fall under the category of people whose behavior raises concerns: from a person who committed a minor offense to someone who publicly criticizes the authorities or does not demonstrate the necessary loyalty," explained Islam Belokiev*.
The activist also pointed out another recent statement by Kadyrov. "In a conversation in Chechen with Delimkhanov, he stated that in the overwhelming majority (99.9%) of conflicts involving Chechens outside the republic, the Chechens themselves are to blame. He also instructed to return participants of such conflicts to Chechnya and send them to fight against Ukraine. This is very telling. It creates a kind of presumption of guilt: if a Chechen is involved in any conflict outside the republic, he is declared guilty in advance, and the punishment for this is sending him to the front. There is a certain parallel with how Kadyrov previously spoke about the deportation of the Chechen and Ingush peoples in 1944. In 2013, Kadyrov opposed holding mourning events on February 23, when Chechens remember the beginning of Stalin's deportation – moreover, he expressed the idea that Chechens themselves were to blame for being evicted. In fact, the responsibility for the crime of the Soviet state against an entire nation was shifted onto the victims themselves. At that time, attempts were made to limit public remembrance of the deportation, effectively pushing this tragic date out of public life in the republic. This caused serious discontent and criticism from Chechen society," reminded Belokiev*.
The anniversary of the Stalinist deportation of Chechens and Ingush has not been officially commemorated in Chechnya since 2011. "Caucasian Knot" has prepared a reference "How Kadyrov turned mourning on February 23 into a celebration".
In his opinion, in both cases, the same logic can be traced: Chechens are offered to perceive themselves as the culprits of their own situation. "If the people were deported – then they were to blame themselves. If Chechens face conflicts and problems outside the republic, they are again to blame themselves. Young people are sent to the front under pressure, and this is presented as a consequence of their own wrong behavior. But behind all this lies a much more serious political question: Chechnya remains a region with a special history of relations with the federal center, two devastating wars, and a lasting historical memory of the struggle for independence. Therefore, control over Chechen society, primarily over the younger generation, is of particular importance to the Kremlin. I view what is happening as part of a policy of suppressing potential dissent, preventing the emergence of independent social movements, and preventing the formation of any centers of resistance to Russian power. Moreover, this is not only about controlling the population within Chechnya but also about extending this control to Chechens living in other regions of Russia," emphasized Belokiev*.
Kadyrov's practice serves the interests of the Kremlin
He is convinced that Kadyrov acts as an appointee of the Kremlin in this case, rather than as an independent regional leader implementing his own ideas about discipline. "His system of governance in Chechnya exists with the political and financial support of the Kremlin, so it would be wrong to view what is happening solely as Kadyrov's personal initiative or his peculiar whim. I do not rule out that this policy is also driven by a broader strategic calculation of the federal center: Chechen society has experience of armed resistance to Russia, and the memory of the struggle for independence is preserved in several generations. In the event of a serious internal or international crisis, including a possible large-scale confrontation between Russia and Western countries, the presence of numerous young Chechens with combat experience and a historical memory of resistance could potentially be perceived by the Kremlin as a threat factor," explained the activist.
The mass sending of young Chechens to the Ukrainian front may serve to solve several tasks at once, believes Belokiev*. "To replenish the Russian army, to increase the dependence of Chechen families on regional authorities, to destroy social ties, and to reduce the potential ability of society for independent political mobilization. Of course, we do not have a published document that directly confirms the existence of an order in the Kremlin to eliminate combat-capable Chechen youth or to direct them to the front specifically to prevent future struggles for independence. But the political consequences of what is happening and the possible interests of the federal center need to be discussed," he stated.
Chechens are made to understand that they may be subject to control and pressure from republican authorities regardless of where they live.
The scale and nature of reports about the forced recruitment of combatants in Chechnya have a special specificity. "Human rights defenders and independent researchers have repeatedly described cases where young people were sent to the front for alcohol use, drug use, minor offenses, and other misdemeanors. I cannot confirm a comparable picture in other Russian regions; the Chechen case deserves special attention. Ultimately, participation in hostilities here turns not only into fulfilling a military duty but also into a tool for punishment, intimidation, and political discipline of society. That is why Kadyrov's current statement should be viewed much more broadly than just a threat to individual offenders. Essentially, Chechens are made to understand that they may be subject to control and pressure from republican authorities regardless of where they live, and their fate may depend on how their behavior aligns with the authorities' notions of what is acceptable. This is no longer just a matter of forced military conscription; it is a matter of political control over an entire people and limiting its ability to independently determine its future," summarized Islam Belokiev*.
Threats to the relatives of the "offenders"
The principle of collective family, clan, and teip responsibility has always been actively applied by Kadyrov, reminded the chairwoman of the Civil Assistance Committee* Svetlana Gannushkina*.
"Therefore, troubles, and significant ones, can begin for all relatives of the disobedient. I have to be very careful not to name names and make it easy to identify who I am cooperating with and from whom I receive information. Sometimes Western migration services do not understand this and try to verify information about Chechens seeking asylum in our state bodies, which leads to disastrous results," she stated.
Coercion to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense has also been repeatedly used to pressure the family members of the undesirables: for example, in November 2025, security forces in Chechnya kidnapped four relatives of Hamzat Dadaev, who lives abroad, and forced them, including a minor, to sign military contracts. After widespread publicity, they were allowed to return home, which became known in January 2026.
Delimkhanov, as a close person to Kadyrov, will carry out his assignments by all means, noted the human rights defender. "This means that he will carry out any orders from Ramzan Kadyrov, including those that go beyond his official duties," Gannushkina added.
Speaking about the possible nature of the "concerns", the human rights defender noted that various accusations can be made against anyone deemed undesirable by Kadyrov's people. "This is done easily and quite diversely," she added.
Personal and official relationships, in her opinion, are not separated in Kadyrov's consciousness. "He considers himself the head of all Chechens, not of the Chechen Republic as a subject of the Russian Federation. And he is allowed to do this by the federal leadership," pointed out Gannushkina*.
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* included in the register of foreign agents by the Ministry of Justice of Russia.
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Translated automatically via OpenAI from https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/428315




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